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would receive the unqualified approval of the President of the
United States. That being so, the mere form in which the
order was addressed to Admiral Skerrett seems to be a matter
of no serious consequence.
"The control given to Mr. Trist over the military operations
in Mexico, when war was flagrant, was far greater than that
which was confided to Mr. Blount."
FACTS WHICH ARE SAID TO PREVENT WORDS
CREATING A SEPARATE USE FROM HAVING
THAT EFFECT.
By R. C. McMURT=,

LL.D.

The decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in July
last, in the case of McConnel v. Wright, 15o Penn. Rep. 275,
must be most carefully considered by conveyancing counsel
of that State. Its importance can scarcely be over-estimated,
not only as to wills and settlements in the future, but as to all
wills in the past. As exhibiting a peculiar development of the
law it is of interest to the profession everywhere.
It is not proposed to criticise, for that is useless and possibly
unbecoming, but there must be suggestions made that may
assume the form of criticism, or be thought to do so, in the
effort to make the point of the case clearly understood. For
it is impossible to appreciate the effect of the decision without
considering the grounds assigned for the judgment and their
relative importance in ascertaining what is the precise point
involved.
A testatrix devised real and personal property to a married
woman (married at the date of the will), in fee simple. There
was a power to sell for payment of debts and legacies and for
the purposes of distribution.
The debts and legacies absorbed the personalty and there
was nothing that came to the devisee but unimproved suburban
or city lots. The taxes exceeded the income. The devise
which was otherwise an unrestricted devise in fee, concluded
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with these words, "freefrom the control of her presentorfuture
husband and without any liability for the debts, liabilities or
engagements of suck husband, but wholly for her own use and
benefit, subject to her control." The will was dated Febi-uary 23,
1886. The testatrix died August 16, 18.88, very nearly two
years and six months after the making of the will. The
property had been laid out in lots for sale, and the testatrix
had sold some of them.
The devisee (then a married woman), sold some of the
property, and in an action for the purchase money the want of
power to convey and give a good title was the sole question.
The decision was that a good title had been conveyed.
Every fact that was supposed to bear on this question has
been stated. And no one can or will dispute that the point
intended to be decided was that the will did not convey
a separate use, but an unrestricted fee simple.
It was not intended to depart from. the Pennsylvania rule
that the person seized of a separate use cannot convey a title
unless expressly empowered by the instrument creating the
title. Nothing can be clearer than that this rule was assumed
to be obligatory.
It was not intended to decide that there was a power given
under which the sale was valid. The contrary is implied
throughout. The power that was given was referred to, but
only as bearing on the character, or rather to use correct
language, the quality of the estate.
The grounds of the judgment are: Ist. The words of the
will defining the estate devised, conveyed a separate use.
2d. The testatrix must be presumed to have.known the value,
and extent of her estate at the time she made. her will.
But the facts thus presumed to be in her mind and that bear
on the meaning of the will, are facts as they existed at the time
of her death. This is shown in the case stated and in the
judgment. Whether they were the same as they were when
she made the will does not appear; nobody alludes to this,
though it is the basis of the judgment. But it seems moderately
clear that when the will was made the property which the
devisee was selling at £I9,ooo an acre, did not yield income
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sufficient to pay taxes, much less municipal charges. And it
would be unfair not to admit that the court had a right
to assume that the testatrix knew when she made the will that
the property that would come to her devisee, was and would
be burdensome, if it was to remain unsold.
3 d. The reason for the decision is that the practical result
of the facts was, that there was a homestead the devisee was
desired to keep up, and no income furnished for the purpose.
5th. There was a power
4 th. The devise was in fee simple.
to sell and give receipts for the purchase money. 6th. The
circumstances surrounding the testator at the time he makes
his will may be considered in construing it. 7th. A separate
use means an equitable estate as distinguished from a legal
estate. 8th. The incidents (i. e., of a separate use) are peculiar
and undesirable. 9 th. It is a question of intention-the
burden of showing this is on one who asserts it-it is to be
ascertained from the four corners of the will, the circumstances
surrounding the testator when he made it, and the condition of
his estate and -his family. These are three whoidy distinct
things, one only of which is in writing.
Hence the court is constrained to say the testatrix did not
intend to create a separate use.
The court had decided that the very words used in this will
did create a separate use: 131 Pa. 476.
It is also admitted
in the judgment that they have this meaning.
It is thus quite clear that words declaring an intention
to create a separate use are not to be relied on as always
sufficient for that purpose.
The conveyancer will ask what am I to inquire into when
I find a will declaring that the estate of a woman married when
the will was made is to be a separate use. The subjects
of inquiry are stated as separately or together being sufficient
to take from those words their meaning.
It may be that the reasons for an opinion or rule may,
if combined, be sufficient, though each one may have little
weight, but in construing words of an ordinary legal instrument,
ctne cannot but feel his incapacity to advise or act under such
a theory. It may be useful, therefore, to eliminate from the
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problem as many of the nine reasons as possible. For it is:
assumed that any one of the reasons which are shown to have
no bearing at all on the question, need not trouble the anxious.
man of business who only seeks to guide himself in the path
prepared for him by those authorized to direct and compel.
The question being not what a word describing neither the
object given nor the devisee, means in the sense of, refers or
points to, but the meaning of the words of grant as describing
the quantity and quality of the estate granted. The second,
third, and sixth reasons consist in facts, and these facts
are really comprised in one short statement-the income
of property given would not pay the taxes-and what effect
has this on the quantity of the estate? Such a state of facts
proves a great ignorance in the testator of the business.
of a conveyancer, if he meant to devise a separate use, for thewords creating a separate use exclude the power to sell or they
mean nothing. The case of one devising land in separate
use which ought to be sold because it yields no income is
very commnon, so common that it has been provided for by
general laws for the most ordinary cases, and, since 1853, for
what was supposed to be all imaginable cases. Bef6re this the
Legislature was applied to. It had never been suggested
that a necessity for selling had any effect to create a power or
to indicate an intention to give an estate which gave the right
to sell as an incident. But the books overflow with cases
where this fact is no ground for the felief of creating a fee.
simple out of a less estate.
It may be that it is a nice distinction between evidence to.
identify an object or person and evidence $of facts de hors the
will to affect the meaning of the words, but. one may respectfully suggest that, plain or obscure, it has been overlooked, for
the two rules are in-this judgment supposed to be one. That
evidence is not admissable, for the later purposes by the
English law needs no voucher.
The point was' urgently
argued and decided: Inchequin v. O'Brien, I Cox, 9.
Not
less than five cases are cited in the note declaring that the
worms of the will and not the circumstances .of the testator are
to guide courts in their construction : I B. & B. 216; 3 Ves.
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IIn; I Mer. 216; I Eden, 43; 2 Br. C. C. 297, and it is
evident that this was the rule as late as 1857 : Grey v. Pearson,
6 H. L. Cases, Io6. The passage in Wigram there referred to
is probably that on p. 9 on the admission of intrinsic
evidence, where it is stated that evidence is never admissable to change the meaning of the words expressed: and
this does not mean that a man can't swear to a meaning, but
that no evidence of facts fixed and eternal or transient and
fleeting written or oral, can effect the meaning of the words.
The reason for the rule has been overlooked wherever
this distinction has not -been observed, and this has not been
infrequent with us. Such evidence transfers the determination
of the meaning of the document to the jury. Such is the
universal rule where oral and written testimony are combined.
The result is the Statute of Wills is repealed-and as these
reasons may be given the go by as antique nonsense, it may
be added of what possible use is the Statute of Frauds, and of
what use are Deeds if this rule is to be admitted.
There is not and'never was any difference between the rules
for admitting evidence in the case of deeds and in the case
of wills on the question of intention. The jury in ejectment
always determine the applicability of the deed to the subject
in dispute; but the effect of the deed or will in determining
the character of the estate has never before been supposed to
depend on the res gestee, or the environment of the parties.
It is, however, clear that whether the distinction was overlooked or overruled, the court has decided that this kind of
evidence is admissable, and that facts of this kind do serve to
prove an intention to create an estate absolutely distinct and
different from the one created by the words; so distinct an
estate as to give a right to sell where none existed, and a right
to spend the proceeds where no such right exists by virtue of
the estate defined by the words of the will.
It is, of course, immaterial that our rule differs from the
English rule, though itdeserves notice that no one has ever
ventured to declare this different result is intentional. It is.
quite important that the change leads to such results.
It will be found that this is the only ground the decision can13
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rest on; the other reasons do not exist. They are so utterly
empty as scarcely to be capable of misleading any one.
The fourth reason is that the devise was in fee simple. There
is in this a very unfortunate vagueness, and possibly there was
a confusion with the thought expressed in the seventh reason.
It has never been suggested that the quantity of the estate
had any bearing on the intention to create a separate use;
though there have been questions raised where no trustee was
interposed. But, united or distihct, these facts have nothing to
do with the question. I say this for it has been settled for so long,
long before Pennsylvania ever heard of a separate use, that
it is the merest question of curiosity, whether it ever was supposed to be otherwise, that there need not be interposed a
legal estate to support the separate use or that the estate of
the cestui que use needs to be restricted in quantity. To say
that a separafe use cannot be declared in favor of a devisee
in fee would be precisely on the level of saying that an
absolute equitable estate in one suijuris wvas not liable to be
sold for the payment -of his debts-it would be a mere
misstatement.'
As a matter of interest we may point out that th6 question
whether a separate u'se could be created in favor of a devisee
in fee was argued, decided in Cochran v. O'Hern, 4 W. & S.
(Pa.) 95, in 1842. It was the point in the case--on the will not
on the deed-which was whether there was courtesy in such
an estate. It was the point argued by Messrs. McCandless &
Biddle. It was decided by GRIER, P. J., below, and with a distinct
knowledge of What he was doing, and in the court above. The
same point had been decided as early as 182i (Jamisonv. Brady,
6 S. &R. Pa. 466), as a proposition requiring no further argument
than that the want of a Court of Chancery did not destroy the
right of a wife in whose favor the separate use had been
created to protection. The right was recognized by courts
IIs it generally known that C. J. GiBsoN says: Nothing is more to be
deprecated than the decisions that a eestui que trust can dispose of his
esiale: -i Raw. 247. He is speaking of trusts for men as well as women,
and what are we to think of the mind of a judge that gravely regrets that
all trust estates are not inalienable, and who evidently assumes there
was a time when they were not, subject to alienation.
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of law when the jurisdiction was separate: 13 C. B. 639,
and in McKenan v. Phillips, 6 Wharton (Pa.) 571, it was said
a countless train of authorities spring up to support the propo-

sition. I very much doubt if, from the time separate uses were
invented, there ever was suggested even a doubt on the point
before this. In 12 Harris,. 429, LOWRIE, J., says, something
that might be supposed by a careless reader to mean that the
separation of the legal title is necessary. But it will be found
he is attempting to explain a self-evident proposition, and in
doing so misstated a rule of law. There was no pretence of
a separate use in the case, an unfortunate attorney was ignorant
enough to think it could be created by purchasing with the
wife's money. The remark does not rise to the dignity of a
dictum. This, which is less than an obiter dichm, this is the
authorty relied on to support the 7 th reason. In 5 Barr,
385, the precise reverse was decided and was the point of the
case.
Unless, therefore, the rule ex nihilo nihlfit does not apply
in ratiocination, it is plain reasons 4 and 7 are eliminated.
The 5th is that there was a power to sell and give receipts,
but the power is restricted to sell in payment of debts
and legacies and could not be exercised for the occasion
never arose. And as a matter of inference it is precisely
the reverse of the' inference that is drawn. Powers may
be used to show what estate is given, but then they are not
what we call powers. They are words indicating the kind of
use or enjoyment that can be made of the thing given, or
defining the incidents of the estate from which the nature of
the estate may be inferred; they are what are called motives
for giving, not purposes for which the property is given. The
distinction was first suggested by Sir W. Grant, 6 Ves. 249,
and acted on by Sir W. Page Wood in Saunderson's Trusts, 3
K. & I. 507. But a power to sell and give receipts has no
meaning at all if the donee of the power is also the owner,
unless the legal estate is in another. Therefore, instead of
proving that the words have an intention to give a beneficial
fee, they imply that the testator thought she was giving an
estate that could not be applied even to pay her own debts
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and legacies unless a power was given. And the same remark
applies to the power to sell to settle the estate.
The 8th is difficult to deal with. One asks what bearing
on the meaning of the words defining an estate has the fact
that the incidents of the estate thus created are peculiar and
undesirable. Peculiarity of incident, is the creation of the law.
It is irtipossible to conceive of this as tending to change the
meaning of words given by the law itself. It is a mere contradiction. The undesirabilityof the incidents is a good reason
for changing 'them or destroying the estate that had the
incident, as was done with estates tail. But when we remember
that these incidents are solely the creations of the court, and
this particular one the most sedulously cherished and proclaimed as the product of the superior wisdom of our courts
over the English Chancellors, it seems difficult to conceive
that these can' either, separate or combined,-be a reason for
affecting a change in the meaning of the words defining the
estate.
The 9th, viz., that it is a matter of intention no one disputes. The decision, therefore, is that the intention as to the
quantity or quality of the estate granted, is to be a~certained
from facts outside the will, and not from the words defining
the estate, and these -facts can suffice to vary the written
description of the estate in the will; the. facts being that a
power of sale is required for the enjoyment of an income for
maintenance, and that without such a power the devise is a
burden.
This is a rule under which conveyancers must practice. A
Irief of Title will hereafter contain a statement of the charadcter of the property and its capacity of being utilized without
a sale, as determining the nature of the estate. It is not in the
will we are to look for a definition of the estate.
The testatrix (presumably knowing the law) selected
words disabling her devisee from selling, and gave no power
to sell; how does this tend to show she did not mean to dis.rble her, but that she meant the exact reverse. Would it not be
well to ascertain what these aphorisms mean, or to stop using
hm?
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Now, the constant reiteration of phrases like this, really misleads; the will means what it says, and no one ought ask or
care if the testator did, or did not, intend it. The statute forbids the ascertaining his intention in any other way than by a
writing signed, and here it is, quite plain that the words
used have no meaning or effect, except to exclude the right to
sell or deal as owner. The husband's rights are excluded,
and so are those of his creditors. A claise is, therefore, struck
out, because, if it operates, the property costs more than can
be got from it by renting. This is certainly the new rule by
which to construe a will, though reduced in bulk, and with
the fog of words dispersed.
Two things are perfectly clear. The testatrix could not
have really known the state of the law, or the meaning of the
words she used, or she was very foolish, if not cruel. But
these facts are absolutely immaterial. She did what thousands
have done; she omitted to give a power, probably not knowing
it was needed. Before 1853, we applied to the Legislature.
Norris v. Clynier, 2 Barr., shows that no one supposed that
facts such as existed here affected the meaning of the will, or
enlarged or altered an estate, or even confined a power. The
Price Act of 1853, has no excuse for existence, except the
existence of facts like those which have now become the chief
factors to determine the meaning of the words of a will as to
the quality of the estate. Not what thing was meant by a
word, but what a thing is, that can be created only by words,
i. e., the definition of words, and those purely technical words.
Another change has been made that seems to have been
overlooked.
The testatrix used words that meant three
things, that is, effected three consequences. They meant that
the devisee cannot sell, she cannot devise, and her husband
cannot have any interest in the thing devised. Yet, though
using these words with a knowledge of the state of her
property, that knowledge makes them mean that the devisee
may sell and spend the money, and she may devise, and the
husband will be tenant by the courtesy if the land is not sold;
if it is, he will own a third, or a half of the proceeds, if they
are not squandered.
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If all this has been affected by overlooking so commonplace a rule of evidence as that which prohibits the meaning of
the words of a will (not their application to a subject), to be
affected by parol or by facts, dehors the will, it is quite impossible to say where the effect of the judgment will end, for it
covers all documents under which property is transferred,
whether deeds, wills, or contracts.
Does not the decision deserve the study of all conveyancers.
And is it indecorous to endeavor to attract that attention and
endeavor to make the point clear ?
There are two points for criticism on this judgment. Ist.
The evidence was inadmissable for the purpose to which it has
been applied. The citation of the authority may seem a mere
impertinence, for what authority can equal that of the
Supreme Court? But it is not an authority for a legal dogma
which might have been stated the other way.- The authority
is merely the explanation, or rather the application of a statute,
and one that cannot be over-estimated in importance. The will
must be in writing, and no external evdence can be admitted to
prove the meaning of the words, because the statute requires
it to be in writing. If facts dehors the will can givd a meaning to the words, the will is no longer in writing, it is partly
in writing, and partly in the facts. The rule as stated in the
judgment, criticised, is the same in England as here; the mistake was in supposing it to be a universal proposition, a mistake of logic which seems to be inherent in the American
mind; probably from the contempt for scholastic training
which we see and hear on all sides.
2d. The evidence, if permitted to be read, had no tendency
to prove the point for which it was used. It certainly proves
either great folly or absolute ignorance, or something worse in
the testatrix; if it -proved her intention as to the kind of
estate she meant to give, that is one that her devisee could sell
and convey, it proved a mistake was made in' writing the will.
But no one can possibly assert that an intention, if proved or
admitted, tends in the slightest degree to change the meaning
of the deed or document. It may authorize a re.formation,
and the fact that such a jurisdiction is ever exercised, proves
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that the meaning is not changed, but that the reverse is true.
But this reformation is not permitted in wills; not because they
are more sacred than any other paper, but because the statute
requires them to be in writing and signed at the end; if they
are not signed, the property by law belongs to the heir or nextof kin, and the power to divest that title has not been well
executed. This doctrine is obscured by the mode of stating it
copied from Lord COKE. It is by him stated as if it were the
fondness of the law for the heir. Whereas, it should be stated
as a power given by law to take from the heir, provided it is
done in a certain way.
The way to test this, is to assume that instructions in writing
signed by the testator were to give an estate that would at the
same time enable the devisee to sell and use the money but
also confer a separate use. Then, that the will was written in
these words, and the testatrix assured this would have the
effect she desired. No one would, or could then dispute that
the conveyancer had blundered; no one would attempt to
drgue that the meaning of the will was changed, or that the
instructions could be used to construe the will. It may be
that it is better to let in the evidence and go to a jury on
the meaning of wills. But the alternative is either this or the
English rule, which till now, we have always supposed was the
same as ours. And certainly no one desires or intends anything so absurd as to change the rule.
Probably the question of the admission of evidence turns
on the meaning of sensible. If that has the meaning that it
has in characterizing a will as a sensible will, when conversing
about a friends will, the court was right in looking at the
evidence to ascertain that it was a very foolish will, and of
what importance is that fact? But if by, sensible is meant
capable of operation, though producing unfortunate and
probably unforseen results, which is the legal meaning of the
word, the evidence, if admissible, had no bearing on the will.
Oxenden v. Chichester, 4 Dow, 65, decides that if there be
a thing answering the words used to describe it in a devise, no
evidence is admissable that the testator intended something
else to form part of that thing for the purpose of the devise.
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As there is no power to vary a principle once decided in the
House of Lords saving by Act of Parliament, and it is
absolutely immaterial whether the decision is right or wrong,
we may be quite certain that this is still the rule in that country.
And, therefore, when they use the same words as we do as to
the admissability of evidence, they do not mean that you can
change the meaning of the words by any facts, if those words
can mean what they express when applied to things as they
are. Has any one ever pretended or imagined that the canon
of evidence hid a different meaning on the opposite-sides of
the Atlantic.

